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Introduction 
For over two millenia, philosophers have been captivated by the question, 
“What is Art?” Attempts at defining art go back to Plato and have 
continued until the present day. In the last century, while doubts about the 
possibilty and/or fruitfulness of such definitions have been raised, the 
enterprise continues to captivate philosophers, artists and even playwrites. 
In her entertaining exploration of the topic in the play Art (1994), Yasmina 
Reza dramatizes these concerns in regards to modern, abstract painting. 
Can a canvas painted entirely white be a work of art? How? Plato’s classic 
definition that art is mimesis, an immitation of reality, seems obsolete in 
such a case. As Arthur Danto observes: “Plato had had an easy run, from 
the sixth century BC until AD 1905-7, with the so-called Fauves – Wild 
Beasts – and Cubism,” after which his definition became increasingly 
questionable in the face of such painting.1 
As for Danto, once a painter himself, it was the modern art of Andy 
Warhol that in 1964 woke him from his ‘dogmatic slumbers’. Strolling 
through the Stable Gallery in midtown New York, he happened upon 
Warhol’s Brillo Boxes, a pile of plywood boxes that looked uncannily 
similar to the containers of Brillo Pads, the commerical steel wool and soap 
scouring pads sold to clean blackened cookware.2 It was this similarity that 
raised for him the question: What properties differentiate artworks from 
mundane objects (events, states of affairs)? His early, more analytic attempt 
at answering the question began with his article ‘The Artworld’ (1964) and 
                                                
York H. Gunther is Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Humanities and Language 
Division at Mahidol University International College, Thailand. The article is dedicated to 
the memory of Arthur C. Danto, teacher, mentor and friend. 
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culminated in his most influential book, The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace. 3  However, almost two decades later, he revisited the 
question in his essay ‘Art and Meaning’, a definition he continued to 
develop until his last book, What Art Is.4 It is this later attempt at defining 
art that I want to consider here. While the issue of how the early and later 
definitions relate is certainly interesting, it will not be something I explore 
in this article. 
I begin by considering the first two properties that Danto proposed 
in ‘Art and Meaning’: content and embodiment. That is to say, art is 
necessarily about something (unlike mundane objects) and it must be 
manifested physically (unlike Platonic forms or disembodied ideas). While 
this explanation is well motivated in some respects, I maintain that it is 
problematic. I next consider a third condition that Danto introduces in his 
last book, that artworks are “wakeful dreams”.5 Although underdeveloped, 
I offer a way of fleshing out the metaphor through what I dub ‘aesthetic 
force’. I conclude by explaining this notion and using it to address the 
problems that I raise for Danto’s account. 
 
Danto’s First Two Conditions: Content and Embodiment 
Among the cornerstones of Danto’s philosophy of art is his claim that 
artworks have intentional content. Unlike chairs, mountains or shooting 
stars, artworks are about things (objects, events, states of affairs, and so 
on). For example, Edouard Manet’s Olympia depicts a female prostitute 
reclining on a bed to whom a servant is bringing a bouquet of flowers. Of 
course, the painting is about more than just that: it is surely also about the 
hypocrisy of a nineteenth century art-going bourgeoisie, the role of 
spectatorship in art, and, by likening a Parisian prostitute to Titian’s Venus 
of Urbino, the gradual empowerment of women. 
It is noteworthy that, according Danto, non-representational as well 
as representational artworks have content. Despite the fact that the major 
works of Jackson Pollock and Robert Rauschenberg, among countless other 
abstract artists, do not depict material objects, this does not imply that they 
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are not about anything. For example, Pollock’s splash and drip canvases 
are about, among other things, movement and color and Rauschenberg’s 
three-paneled White Painting (1951) is about shadows and the changes of 
light that register on its surface. In fact, even an artwork about nothing has 
content. As Danto is apt to observe, a distinction must be recognized 
between “not being about anything and being about nothing”.6 A painting 
about nothing still has content. The type of intentional content Danto 
believes that all artworks have seems to be Fregean in character.7 This is 
suggested in several ways. First, artworks that lack reference (for example, 
those about nothing) have content. 8  Second, an artwork’s content is 
something that can (at least in part) be expressed descriptively. One of the 
central goals of art criticism, according to Danto, is to make explicit an 
artwork’s content (meaning),9 and this, of course, is what the critic does 
through descriptions. In fact, the critic’s role in expressing the artwork’s 
content is especially required in the case of contemporary art, which is 
commonly not only non-representative but about the concept of art itself.10 
A critic’s knowledge of the various social, political, historical, etc., 
conditions of the artwork’s creation, possession and consumption thereby 
helps her to express the work’s content because, in general, a work does not 
wear its meaning (content) on its sleeve. In effect, this suggests Danto’s 
utilization of a Fregean notion of content as well. Content, after all, is 
considered by him to be a non-perceptual (abstract) property: “what makes 
something art is not something that meets the eye”.11 
It should be mentioned that while all artworks, according to Danto, 
have content, this does not imply that an artwork’s content must remain 
invariable over time or that it must have one content (whatever that could 
mean). (This could be regarded as a departure from a strictly Fregean 
model of content [thought], one that identifies meanings with Platonic 
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8 I recognize that this is put rather quickly and requires a more substantial defence. But, it 
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9 Danto, ‘Art and Meaning’, p. xxviii. 
10 Danto, ‘Art and Meaning’, p. ix. 
11 Danto, ‘Art and Meaning’, pp. xxvii-xxviii. 
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entities.) While there are better and worse interpretations (art criticisms) of 
an artwork’s content (dependent on such things as its coherence and how 
well it accounts for biographical details of the artist and the social, 
economic and political conditions of its creation, possession, and 
consumption, among other things), the postmodernist’s claim that meaning 
(content) is highly sensitive to context and ever-changing is consistent with 
Danto’s claim that all artworks have content. In short, by insisting that 
artworks have content one need not be insisting that they have the same or 
a single content in different contexts or at different times. 
Danto’s second condition for art is material embodiment, or just 
‘embodiment’. As he observes, this brings his notion of an artwork into 
conflict with Hegel’s notion of symbolic art, the content of which is 
external to rather than embodied by the object.12 Similarly, the embodiment 
condition also distinguishes Danto’s notion of art from Benedetto 
Croce’s. 13  For Croce, art is ultimately a mental state or event (an 
‘intuition’), one that can be expressed or embodied materially but need not 
be. By contrast, for Danto embodiment is an essential condition of an 
artwork, something without which an object (event, state of affairs) could 
not be a work of art. 
The embodiment condition serves to do several things. For 
example, in addition to distinguishing Danto’s notion of art from both 
Hegel and Croce’s, it enables one to distinguish different kinds of artworks 
with the same contents. For example, it is conceivable that a painting and a 
piece of music could have the same content, e.g. that both could be about 
nothing. Without the embodiment condition, there would be no way of 
distinguishing them as different artworks. For if contents are indeed non-
perceptual (abstract) properties, then there would not be a way of 
distinguishing works based on their distinct material embodiment (in this 
case an object of canvas and paint vs. an event of tones and tempo), let 
alone based on their unique spatiotemporal presence (embodiment). 
Moreover, the embodiment condition enables one to distinguish a 
piece of art criticism from the artwork it is a criticism of. If indeed the goal 
of an art critic is to make explicit the content of an artwork, a good piece of 
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art criticism, one that succeeds in this task, might be taken to have the same 
content as the artwork it is a criticism of. Without the embodiment 
condition, there may not be a way of distinguishing the piece of art 
criticism from the artwork itself. Of course, this may already suggest a 
problem for Danto’s characterization of art. If indeed a piece of art 
criticism and an artwork are embodied and have content, then is not a piece 
of art criticism also an artwork? I will return to this question momentarily.14 
The two conditions certainly differentiate artworks from many non-
artworks. Without the content condition, Danto would be unable to 
distinguish certain kinds of artworks from objects that closely resemble 
them, e.g. Warhol’s Brillo Boxes from commercial Brillo boxes or John 
Cage’s 4’33” from the ordinary clattering and chattering of a group of 
human beings seated in a concert hall. He also would not be able to 
distinguish two artworks that closely resemble one another, such Warhol’s 
Brillo Boxes from the appropriationist artist Mike Bidlo’s Not Warhol. On 
the other hand, without the embodiment condition, Danto would be unable 
to distinguish artworks from mental states and, for that matter, from one 
another. Any two objects, events or state of affairs with the same content 
(whether it is generally considered an artwork, non-artwork, or mental 
state) would effectively be the same without the appeal to embodiment. 
 
The Inadequacy of the First Two Conditions 
While these first two conditions are relatively well-motivated, they do not 
appear to be sufficient. The problem is that many things besides artworks 
meet these conditions, things we would not generally consider art. For 
example, a billboard, a street sign and a soup recipe each have content and 
are embodied. A billboard may be about the luxury and gas mileage of an 
automobile, a content (message) that it materially embodies on poster 
sheets glued to a large wooden or metal frame. A stop sign is about 
stopping and is materially embodied on an octagon shaped piece of 
                                                
14 The embodiment condition, it should be noted, is or at least should be more flexible than 
Danto intimates. For example, works of film, music and photography (especially in digital 
formats) suggest that embodiment cannot require that a work be instantiated in a particular 
material substratum. This leads to the question, “How must it be instantiated?” It seems 
clear that in the case of film, music and photography that the identity of the work is not 
dependent on a token material embodiment, though perhaps it is dependent upon a type of 
material embodiment. But even this might be questioned. If Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony 
were never performed again, many would nevertheless admit that it still exists. 
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aluminum painted red and white. And a recipe is about the ingredients and 
the making of a kind of soup, a content which is materially embodied on 
the pages of a cookbook or on a website. 
Or consider a rather different example; human action. An action 
such as George’s lifting his arm is distinct from mere bodily movement in 
that it involves (essentially) his wanting to lift his arm, an intentional state 
with content. (Note the parallel between an action and artwork on the one 
hand and a mere bodily movement and mundane object on the other). 
Moreover, without being embodied, without a body or at least an arm, 
George could not perform such an action. In this way, actions have both 
content and are embodied. However, while some actions may be parts of or 
may themselves be artworks, most are not. 
The same might be said about a piece of art criticism. Like actions, 
art criticisms have content (they are, among other things, about artworks 
and presumably attempt to make explicit their meanings) and are embodied 
on the pages of a magazine like The Nation. But is it not far-fetched to 
presume that all pieces of art criticism are themselves artworks?! It is 
noteworthy that appealing to the possibility that, in this day and age, 
anything could be an artwork, that any billboard, street sign, soup recipe, 
human action or piece of art criticism could be a work of art, is beside the 
point. The fact is that most billboards, street signs, soup recipes, human 
actions and pieces of art criticism are not artworks despite the fact that they 
meet Danto’s two conditions for art. This is the problem. 
In ‘Art and Meaning’, Danto is not unaware of the problem, which 
he observes was raised to him as a friendly criticism by Noel Carroll.15 But 
his discussion of the matter seems beside the point. He recognizes that the 
original Brillo boxes, designed by the commercial artist James Harvey, 
have content and embodiment just as both Andy Warhol’s Brillo Boxes and 
the appropriationist artist Mike Bidlo’s Not Warhol do. However, he also 
recognizes that Harvey’s Brillo boxes are artworks themselves – works of 
commercial art, to be sure, but artworks all the same! The problem he 
addresses in the latter half of ‘Art and Meaning’ is the problem of how to 
distinguish the contents of these three works, something he believes art 
criticism is well suited for. Despite being almost indistinguishable to the 
eye, the contents of the works of Harvey, Warhol and Bidlo are distinct, 
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which he illustrates characteristically with wonderful adeptness by showing 
that the art criticism appropriate to one is not appropriate to the other. 
While much of his discussion is convincing, it does not speak to the 
problem concerning the inadequacy of his two conditions of art. Short of 
accepting the rather implausible view that all billboards, street signs, 
recipes and so on, are (rather than simply could be) works of art, what 
appears to be needed is a third condition. 
 
A Third Condition: Wakeful Dreams 
In the opening chapter of What Art Is, Danto eventually proposes such a 
condition through a metaphor. He suggests that in addition to content and 
embodiment, artworks are wakeful dreams. While he admits that the 
metaphor is only one he has just begun thinking about, he offers a few 
clues as to what he has in mind. 
First, like the content of dreams, the content of artworks are not 
necessarily true.16 I might dream that there is a snake before me or that I am 
flying a plane but there may be no snake and I might not be piloting a 
plane. Now, it is not just that dreams can be false, the way assertions and 
beliefs can. It seems plausible that Danto was looking for a more 
fundamental distinction, viz. that artworks do not have truth conditions 
intrinsically as assertions and beliefs do. When I assert that it is raining, I 
am making a claim about what the weather is like. As such, my assertion is 
either true or false. To suggest the artworks do not have truth conditions is 
to maintain that they cannot be evaluated as assertions can, viz. as true or 
false. 
Second, by comparing artwork to dreams, Danto attempts to 
emphasize what he calls the “universality of art”17 – after all, everyone 
dreams! Here again it is not entirely obvious what he means by the 
“universality of art”. Is art universal in that anyone, anywhere can 
experience something as art? This seems plausible. Or is it universal 
because anyone, anywhere can produce art? This might also be the case. 
These questions naturally arise given that we, as dreamers, both produce 
and experience our dreams. In fact, it could be argued that we 
simultaneously produce and experience our dreams, we are both artist and 
audience at once! This might be stretching Danto’s analogy too far 
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however, given that the artist’s production process and the audience’s 
experiences of the artwork are generally not only distinguished but not 
simultaneous. 
Third, while dreams per se are private experiential events, artworks 
are shared.18 Both dreams and artworks are “made up of appearances”, as 
Danto puts it, the appearances of the former can be experienced only while 
asleep, while the apperances of the latter require that we are awake. This, of 
course, helps to explain why audiences of, say, plays, movies and works of 
dance and music can laugh, scream or cry together. It is unclear to me, 
however, whether the metaphor of a “wakeful dream” in this sense is doing 
anything more than restating the embodiment condition. For by insisting 
that artworks must be embodied, does not this already ensure that artworks 
are public and thus shareable? 
But, there may be something else Danto has in mind. The 
appearances that we have in dreams while sleeping can often be mistaken 
for real things. I might dream that I see a snake or that I am flying a plane 
and actually believe that there is a snake before me or that I am pilotting a 
plane. This does not seem to be the case when experiencing artworks. 
While they can closely resemble real things, “Art always stands at a 
distance from reality”.19 For example, Warhol’s Brillo Boxes are very 
similar to Brillo boxes; John Cage’s 4’33” can be indistinguishable from 
the ordinary clattering and chattering of a group of human beings in a 
concert hall; or a modern dancer might be mimicking someone ironing a 
skirt or playing football. But, as wakeful dreams, experiencing art requires 
not only that an audience recognize the similarity that these works have to 
the mundane aspects of reality they are about (e.g. that Warhol’s Brillo 
Boxes are in some sense about commerically sold Brillo boxes) but that we 
distinguish the artwork from the non-artwork. 
At first glance, this might appear to be question-begging. After all, 
in assuming that an audience is able to distinguish cognitively an artwork 
from what it is about – particularly in cases where the visual or sonic 
appearances closely resemble one another or are altogether perceptually 
indistinguishable – would not Danto be assuming the very distinction he 
sets out to explain? This need not be the case. It may be that this part of his 
definition of art is relying on a response-dependent framework. So, just as 
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one might characterize secondary qualities response-dependently (e.g. x is 
red if and only if x looks red to a standard observer in standard conditions, 
where ‘looks red’ denotes a subjective response rather than the property of 
redness), perhaps one could state this aspect of Danto’s wakeful dream 
metaphor along similar lines: if x is an artwork, then x is recognized as an 
artwork by a standard observer in standard conditions.20 
As I mentioned above, this is largely speculative on my part given 
how little he says about wakeful dreams. Nevertheless, it may be enough to 
start fleshing out these observations through a notion I dub ‘aesthetic 
force’. 
 
Aesthetic Force 
Where there is content, there is force. In fact, the three properties – content, 
embodiment and force – are recognized and distinguished by linguists as 
well as philosophers, especially of language and mind.21 For example, 
consider an utterance such as ‘John is at home.’ The utterance’s meaning or 
content (its semantics) concerns its aboutness, the fact that it is about John 
being at home. The way this meaning is embodied in the utterance is unique, 
given the distinctive syntax (lexicon and grammar) of English. But 
semantics (content) and syntax (linguistic embodiment) are not the only 
properties that the utterance possesses. It also has illocutionary force or use 
(pragmatics). (In the case of sentences, we might instead speak of mood, 
e.g. indicative, interoggative and optative.) For example, the utterance ‘John 
is at home’ can be used as an assertion, a question or even a wish. In other 
words, while its content and linguistic embodiment remain the same, it can 
have different uses (forces).22 
                                                
20 For a discussion of response-dependence, see Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 108-139. 
21 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1975) and John Searle, Expression and Meaning (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1979). 
22 Obviously, more can be said about the relation between these three properties. For 
example, an utterance’s translation from one language to another illustrates a change of 
linguistic embodiment but a preservation of content and force. An ambiguous utterance 
illustrates a possible change of content and perhaps even of force but a preservation of 
linguistic embodiment. A conversation in which one interlocutor remarks, “John is going to 
the store.” and another responds with “John is going to the store?!” reflects a change of 
force but a preservation of content and linguistic embodiment. 
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What is true of utterances and sentences, I suggest, is likewise true 
of works of art. In much the way that contents can be linguistically 
embodied in different languages, they can be artistically embodied in 
different media, for example, film, painting, music, and sculpture. But if 
artworks have both content and embodiment, then surely they also have 
force: aesthetic force. Elsewhere I argue that aesthetic force is not the same 
as linguistic force, as the force of mundane utterances and sentences.23 
Where an assertion commits the speaker to the truth of a content and a 
question requires that the speaker intends for the hearer to answer, artworks 
have a function without a function. In some respects, this idea is related to 
Kant’s claim that an artwork “is a way of presenting that is purposive on its 
own and that furthers, even though without a purpose”.24 My suggestion, 
however, is fundamentally semantic-pragmatic rather than practical in spirit. 
In claiming this, I am not suggesting that artworks lack a function – this 
would be equivalent to saying that they lack force. Rather, my suggestion is 
that there is a distinctive way in which the contents of artworks are 
presented, that is, functionlessly. 
To clarify this, it is instructive to consider contemporary discussions 
of imagination, as varied and complex as they can be.25 Imagination is 
commonly distinguished from belief in that the latter is governed by the 
norm of truth while the former is not. In believing that p, an individual 
commits herself to the truth of p, which is not the case when she imagines 
that p. While my belief that John is home requires a commitment to John’s 
being at home, my imagination that John is at home does not. Furthermore, 
the content of my imagination, unlike my belief, seems to have a 
phenomenological or ‘quasi-sensory’ component to it. My imagination that 
John is at home, for example, might involve images of John sitting in a chair 
reading or the sound of his voice in the shower singing, which is not 
something required in the case of a belief. In this way, imagination is 
informed or even constrained by what Danto would call ‘appearances’. 
I suggest that the same is true of aesthetic force. The contents an 
artwork bears are not presented as true to an audience – we might say that 
                                                
23 York Gunther, ‘The Ineffable in Art’ (currently under review). 
24 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. W. Phuhar (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 
Publishing, 1987), p. 173. 
25  See Tamar Gendler, ‘Imagination’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/imagination. Accessed 11/11/2016. 
What Art Could Be 
Literature & Aesthetics 26 2016 137 
an artwork’s content lacks such normative conditions. And like imagination, 
the artwork must present its content through some kind of sensory medium. 
However, unlike imaginaton and for that matter the dreams we have while 
asleep, aesthetic force is borne by objects, events and states of affairs that 
are public rather than private.26 Or to put it differently, aesthetic force only 
presents embodied contents. 
This is not to say that an artwork’s force is transparent. One might 
not recognize the fact that the object before one has a function without 
function. But this just illustrates that aesthetic force is not a perceptual 
property – an artwork does not wear its force on its sleeve either. This, of 
course, is true of utterances as well, e.g. to recognize that “Do you have a 
dollar?” is a request (and not just a question), we need to appeal to 
something external to it, viz. a speaker’s intention. Of course, the difference 
in the case of an artwork is that this non-perceptual, external component 
need not be fixed by the artist or performer’s (conscious) intentions or 
mental states. Just what, then, might fix an object’s aesthetic force? This all 
depends on the theory of art one endorses. For example, aesthetic force 
might be fixed external to the artwork by appealing to the artist’s 
unconscious mental states, the social conditions of the work’s origin, the 
audience’s acceptance and/or experience of the work, the art community’s 
reception of it, and so on. (We might regard these as varieties of ‘aesthetic 
pragmatics’). For my purposes here, it is not necessary to decide between 
these theoretical options. But, what is necessary is that there is someone 
able to recognize that an object has aesthetic force if that object is to be 
considered a work of art. In other words, there must be a response-
dependent aspect to aesthetic force. 
In this way, aesthetic force is an essential property of all artworks, 
whether verbal or nonverbal. Their function without function helps to 
distinguish them from other content-bearing media such as billboards, street 
signs and soup recipes. A billboard serves to solicit or entreat, a street sign 
functions as an order or command, and a soup recipe presents its content as 
a directive or suggestion. And a piece of art criticism has the role of 
                                                
26 Kendall Walton actually defines dreams as “spontaneous, undeliberate imaginings which 
the imaginer not only does not but cannot direct (consciously).” See Mimesis as Make-
Believe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 16. He also suggests that 
imaginings can be social (pp. 18-19), which may begin to approximate what I mean by 
aesthetic force, although I will not attempt to investigate this here. 
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describing, questioning and/or criticizing an artwork. Thus, each has a set of 
normative conditions, which artworks do not intrinsically have. Of course, 
this is not to say that artworks themselves cannot entreat, command, 
suggest, request and criticize. We see, for example, paintings, films and 
sculptures used for the sake of propaganda, works meant to persuade 
audiences of something. But, this is not their primary function – this is not 
what makes them works of art. Once an object, event or state of affairs 
becomes an artwork, its previous linguistic and non-linguistic functions are 
superceded (though not necessarily abandoned) by their aesthetic force. In 
other words, like Duchamp’s Fountain which, as an artwork, no longer 
functions (primarily, at least) as a receptacle for urine, any linguistic or non-
linguistic function an object once had is superseded by its role as an 
artwork, as an embodied content with aesthetic force. 
 
Conclusion 
Obviously, much more needs to be said. An argument is required for why 
non-artworks that have content and are embodied never have it. A more 
careful eplanation of what determines aesthetic force is also needed. And 
an account of the relation between aesthetic force as a primary force type 
and secondary, linguistic force types (for example, assertions, questions, 
commands) must also be given. For now, however, I hope to have 
suggested how it, as a condition for art, can serve not only to flesh out 
Danto’s own later attempts at defining art but to enrich our understanding 
of what art could be. 
 
 
